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 CIVIL, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL 
EQUALITY AFTER LINCOLN: 
A PARADIGM AND A PROBLEMATIC 
KATE MASUR*
When it comes to Abraham Lincoln and race, there are few words 
more famous than the future president’s 1858 assertion that he had “no 
purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and 
the black races.”
 
1  The statement cannot be discounted as merely an 
artifact of his intense struggle against Stephen Douglas for a seat in the 
U.S. Senate.  To the contrary, in a standalone speech in Peoria four 
years earlier, Lincoln had said his “own feelings” did not admit of 
making former slaves “politically and socially our equals.”2  At the same 
time, of course, Lincoln also consistently argued for certain kinds of 
racial equality.  As he said in Columbus, Ohio, in 1859, “there is no 
reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights 
enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”3
 My purpose here is not to assess whether Lincoln was racist, or how 
racist.  Nor is it to chart how his own views on equality changed over the 
course of the Civil War.  Rather, it is to reflect on the meanings of the 
separate categories of equality that Lincoln mentioned—natural (or 
civil), political, and social—as they took shape after his death.  The 
historian James Oakes has recently made the interesting argument that 
Lincoln separated natural and civil rights from political and social ones 
because he believed the federal government had power to enforce civil 
 
 
* Assistant Professor of History, Northwestern University. 
1. First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Aug. 21, 
1858, reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1, 16 (Roy P. Basler 
et al. eds., 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS]. 
2. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois, ILL. J., Oct. 21, 23–28, 1854, reprinted in 
2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 1, at 247, 256. 
3. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Columbus, Ohio, ILL. STATE J., Sept. 24, 1859, reprinted 
in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 1, at 400, 402.  See also Sixth Debate with Stephen A. 
Douglas, at Quincy, Illinois, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Oct. 13, 1858, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED 
WORKS, supra note 1, at 245, 248–49 (illustrating Lincoln’s view regarding equality); Fourth 
Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Charleston, Illinois, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Sept. 18, 1858, 
reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 1, at 145, 145–46 (same). 
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rights but not to regulate political or “social” equality.4  I agree with 
Oakes’s contention that Lincoln had considerable respect for the 
conventional prerogatives of states.5  And yet, I argue, it was not only 
the proper relationship between the federal government and the states 
that was at issue when people of the era distinguished between civil, 
political, and social equality.  The categories of equality that Lincoln 
evoked when talking about African Americans’ future in the United 
States were, in fact, malleable and unstable in the early postwar years. 
Defining their content was one of the central projects of 
Reconstruction.6
Much of the evidence used in this paper emerged during my research 
on race and equality in Civil War-era Washington, D.C.
 
7
Postwar Republicans shared with Lincoln a broad consensus that 
African Americans should enjoy civil equality with whites.  Republicans 
generally agreed that civil equality meant equal treatment by laws and, 
implicitly, security of property.
  The District of 
Columbia is an excellent place to study political ideas apart from 
federalism because Congress has exclusive jurisdiction there.  Time and 
again after the Civil War, congressional debates about policy toward the 
District dealt in sweeping terms with the crucial question of what racial 
equality would mean in the reconstructed nation. 
8
 
4. James Oakes, Natural Rights, Citizenship Rights, States’ Rights, and Black Rights: 
Another Look at Lincoln and Race, in OUR LINCOLN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LINCOLN AND 
HIS WORLD 109, 109–34 (Eric Foner ed., 2008). 
  Lincoln had said that he believed in the 
natural equality of black and white people.  The natural rights he 
mentioned, the ones described in the Declaration of Independence as 
5. See id. at 125–34. 
6. Recent works on contemporary categories of equality include JANE DAILEY, BEFORE 
JIM CROW: THE POLITICS OF RACE IN POSTEMANCIPATION VIRGINIA 85–93 (2000); 
Elizabeth Dale, “Social Equality Does Not Exist among Themselves, nor among Us”: Baylies 
vs. Curry and Civil Rights in Chicago, 1888, 102 AM. HIST. REV. 311 (1997); Nell Irvin 
Painter, “Social Equality,” Miscegenation, Labor, and Power, in THE EVOLUTION OF 
SOUTHERN CULTURE 47 (Numan V. Bartley ed., 1988); RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE 
AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 153–73 (1999); HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE 
DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR 
NORTH, 1865–1901, at 122–55 (2001); Hannah Rosen, The Rhetoric of Miscegenation and the 
Reconstruction of Race: Debating Marriage, Sex, and Citizenship in Postemancipation 
Arkansas, in GENDER AND SLAVE EMANCIPATION IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 289 (Pamela 
Scully & Diana Paton eds., 2005); Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the 
Conceptual Roots of the Plessy Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777 (2008). 
7. KATE MASUR, AN EXAMPLE FOR ALL THE LAND: EMANCIPATION AND THE 
STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (2010). 
8. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 290–91 (2d ed. 1995). 
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the rights to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,” were the basis 
for this concept of civil rights.  That is, natural rights, when translated 
into the world of laws and men, were civil rights, which were also often 
considered fundamental rights.  Making policy for the capital, 
Republicans in Congress put the principle of civil equality into practice 
in the spring of 1862, first by abolishing slavery and then, weeks later, by 
overturning the antebellum black codes, which had created separate 
categories of crime for blacks and whites.9
Lincoln and many other moderate Republicans had long 
distinguished between civil equality and political equality, supporting 
the former but not the latter.
 
10  But African-American activists and 
some white radical Republicans insisted on a far more expansive vision 
of fundamental equality before the law.  Many argued that civil equality 
should include the vote, which they considered a fundamental right 
whose origins, like the origins of other civil rights, were in natural law.11  
Many also believed the principle of civil equality to require that African 
Americans have equal access to public schools, common carriers (such 
as streetcars, railroads, and steamers), and other public 
accommodations.12  In part because of disagreements among 
Republicans over the definition of civil rights, Congress’s two major 
statements about civil rights in 1866—the Civil Rights Act and the 
Fourteenth Amendment—left considerable ambiguity about the 
boundaries of federally enforceable civil rights.13
During the postwar debate about equality, whenever radicals pushed 
the bounds of racial equality—for example, by demanding the equal 
right to vote, hold office, or enjoy access to public schools or public 
accommodations—opponents charged them with seeking something that 
just about everyone professed to despise: social equality.  Unlike the 
terms “civil equality” and “political equality,” “social equality” had no 
 
 
9. See Act of Apr. 16, 1862, ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376; Act of May 21, 1862, ch. 83, 12 Stat. 407. 
10. FONER, supra note 8, at 290–91; Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary 
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863,  881–
83 (1986).  
11. MASUR, supra note 7, at 132–33; see also id. at 7–8; Donald G. Nieman, The 
Language of Liberation: African Americans and Equalitarian Constitutionalism, 1830–1950, in 
THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY EXPERIENCE 67–81 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 58, 
88–89, 96–98 (2000).  
12. MASUR, supra note 7, at 105, 164–65, 227–30. 
13. Kaczorowski, supra note 10, at 926; Earl Maltz, The Civil Rights Act and the Civil 
Rights Cases: Congress, Court, and Constitution, 44 FLA. L. REV. 605, 620–22 (1992).  
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true content, no concrete existence.  Instead, people used social equality 
as a gloss for inappropriate government interference in whatever 
relationships they believed should properly be considered private 
matters of personal taste.  Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson, for 
example, argued in 1864 that a law forbidding racial discrimination on 
Washington’s streetcars amounted to a social-equality measure.14  
Protection of African Americans’ “life and property” was acceptable, he 
argued (alluding to natural or civil rights), but the government should 
not intervene in matters of “political rights and social enjoyment,” 
which had to do with the “preference on our part for the society of those 
whom we deem God has created our equals.”15  One conservative 
newspaper insisted that Congress should not enfranchise black men in 
the District because the vote was a “purely social question.”16
When people mobilized the specter of social equality, they were not 
merely distinguishing between rights that were fundamental and those 
that were not, or between the proper scope of the federal government 
and that of states or localities.  They were also demarcating the spaces 
where private preferences, not public policy, should reign.  For example, 
in 1869, when a Republican-dominated Washington City Council passed 
a law barring racial discrimination in the city’s theaters and restaurants, 
the Republican Chicago Tribune derided it, insisting that hotels and 
theaters “offer entertainments and amusement merely,” and that the 
“only function the government has in relation to them is to preserve 
order, not to regulate the class of people who shall go to them.”
 
17  
Meanwhile, a moderate Republican newspaper in Washington predicted 
that few “colored people will avail themselves of the privileges given 
them by the law,” since they “are acquiring a good deal of self-respect, 
and are not disposed to thrust themselves, socially, where they are not 
wanted.”18
 
14. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1156–57 (1864). 
 
15. Id. at 1157. 
16. Editorial, NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 11, 1866, at 2. 
17. Editorial, The Admission of Colored People to Places of Amusement, EVENING 
STAR (Wash., D.C.), June 17, 1869, at 2 (quoting the Tribune). 
18. Editorial, Equality at Places of Amusement, EVENING STAR (Wash., D.C.), June 7, 
1869, at 2 (emphasis added).  See also The Colored Citizen, WORLD (N.Y.), June 5, 1869, at 1; 
How the Negroes Will Legislate, WORLD (N.Y.), June 14, 1869, at 5; Social Equality, WORLD 
(N.Y.), Dec. 1, 1869, at 3; Editorial, WASH. EXPRESS, July 20, 1869, at 1; Phineas Indritz, Post 
Civil War Ordinances Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in the District of Columbia, 42 GEO. 
L.J. 179, 187–89 (1954).  For the traditional role of local governments in chartering and 
regulating corporations, see William J. Novak, The American Law of Association: The Legal–
Political Construction of Civil Society, 15 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 163, 180–82 (2001). 
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When Democrats and Republican moderates charged African 
Americans who demanded access to theretofore-white-only institutions 
with seeking dreaded “social equality,” they were offering an expansive 
vision of the private realm and a concomitantly narrow vision of the 
public.  Indeed, the genius or power of the discourse of social equality 
was that it evoked a large and heterogeneous realm—whether 
considered social, private, or sociable—where Americans had long 
imagined that they had liberty to choose with whom to associate.  
Before the Civil War, the author of an antebellum New York society 
manual, reflecting on the differences between democracy in political life 
and exclusivity in “society,” had stated that political equality “‘does not 
extend to the drawing-room.’”19  The author continued: “‘None are 
excluded from the highest councils of the nation, but it does not follow 
that all can enter into the highest ranks of society.’”20
So sacrosanct was the social realm that Reconstruction radicals 
typically attempted to deny that they sought social equality, even as they 
argued for an expansive definition of equality before the law that 
included equal rights to attend public schools and to use public 
accommodations.  For example, Washington’s radical Republican 
Chronicle used images of two well-known New York neighborhoods to 
dramatize the distinction between political equality, which that paper 
supported, and social equality, which it did not.  “Fifth avenue and the 
Five Points are politically equal,” an editorial commented, “but in a 
social point of view they are as far removed from each other as the 
poles.”
  The social realm 
was defined by personal choice and hierarchy, and it remained cordoned 
off from the political arena, in which white men were formally equal. 
21
Disavowing an interest in social equality, radicals sought to 
emphasize the publicness of institutions such as public schools and 
public accommodations, arguing that these were institutions regulated 
by government and obligated to serve a public that now included not 
only whites but African Americans as well.  For example, in an 1872 
debate over Senator Charles Sumner’s supplemental Civil Rights Act, 
 
 
19. SVEN BECKERT, THE MONIED METROPOLIS: NEW YORK CITY AND THE 
CONSOLIDATION OF THE AMERICAN BOURGEOISIE, 1850–1896, at 45 (2001) (quoting THE 
LAWS OF ETIQUETTE OR, SHORT RULES AND REFLECTIONS FOR CONDUCT IN SOCIETY 10 
(2d ed., Phila., Carey, Lea & Blanchard 1836)). 
20. Id. (emphasis added). 
21. Editorial, Social Equality, DAILY MORNING CHRON. (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2, 1865, 
at 2. See also Editorial, Social Equality, DAILY MORNING CHRON. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 22, 
1866, at 2. 
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which proposed a federal ban on discrimination in public 
accommodations, Senator Lot Morrill, a moderate Republican from 
Maine, argued against the bill on grounds that it concerned “rights of a 
strictly domiciliary character.”22
A man’s private domicile is his own castle . . . .  But the 
public inn, the public or common school, the public place 
of amusement, as well as common carriers, asking the 
special protection of law, created through its action on 
the plea and for the benefit of the public good, have no 
such exclusive right as the citizen may rightfully claim 
within his home . . . .
  In response to Morrill’s use of the term 
“domiciliary” to invoke the home and the private realm more generally, 
black activist George T. Downing countered (in a letter that Charles 
Sumner later read to the Senate): 
23
Morrill himself had argued that “equality before the law” was a 
constitutional right, Downing pointed out.
 
24  The Sumner bill simply 
represented a codification of that reasoning.25
An 1872 decision by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia 
illustrated the logic and institutional power of those who argued for an 
expansive private realm in which racial discrimination could not be 
prohibited by government.  In a decision overturning a local public 
accommodations law, the District’s highest court held that the municipal 
government had stepped outside its bounds in forbidding racial 
discrimination in restaurants, theaters, and other public 
accommodations.
  Downing’s case was 
cogent, and the Sumner bill would eventually pass.  In the end, however, 
such arguments for an expansive definition of the public realm—and for 
a vision of constitutional equality that extended to public 
accommodations—would fail. 
26  In fact, the court concluded, “[t]he proprietor of a 
hotel or restaurant was the proper judge of who should have either 
refreshments or lodgings in his house, and no one could dispute his 
authority in that matter.”27
 
22. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. App. 4 (1872). 
  The local court thus also rejected the 
argument, advanced both by Sumner and local black activists, that 
23. George T. Downing, Letter to the Editor, DAILY MORNING CHRON. (Wash., D.C.), 
Jan. 31, 1872, at 3.  See also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. App. 729 (1872). 
24. See Downing, supra note 23, at 3. 
25. See id. 
26. See A Man’s House His Castle—Sebastian Aman’s Case Decided, DAILY MORNING 
CHRON. (Wash., D.C.), Dec. 7, 1872, at 4. 
27. Id. 
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licensed public accommodations were institutions of a different stature 
from conventional private property.  Rather, the judge’s use of the term 
“house” to describe restaurants and inns signaled his conviction that 
public accommodations were akin to private homes and that the law was 
essentially a social equality measure. 
United States Supreme Court decisions of the 1870s and 1880s 
helped end the postwar debate about the content of the categories of 
civil, political, and social equality.  Most significantly, in 1883, the U.S. 
Supreme Court would codify the distinction between the acceptable 
rights outlined by the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the unacceptable 
government incursions into private life mandated by the 1875 Civil 
Rights Act.  In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court declared that the right 
to racially equal access to public accommodations was not among the 
“fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship.”28  
Any arenas not explicitly mentioned in the 1866 law, the Court held, 
concerned “what may be called the social rights of men and races in the 
community.”29  The Court thus categorized access to public 
accommodations as “social rights” that were, by definition, not 
“fundamental.”30  The federalism piece of the reasoning was that only 
local governments could decide how to regulate such “social rights of 
men and races” (implying, for example, that Massachusetts could have 
its public accommodations laws and Tennessee could have its Jim Crow 
laws).31
Arguments against social equality—arguments that insisted on a 
very broad definition of private relationships and a relatively narrow 
vision of the public realm—were central to the architecture of twentieth-
century Jim Crow.  “Perhaps nothing perplexes the outside observer 
more than the popular term and the popular theory of ‘no social 
equality,’” wrote the Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal in 1944.
  But as we have seen, the power of the federal government was 
not all that was at issue here.  Also implicated was the question of where 
Americans would fix the boundary between the realm of the state and 
the realm of private interest. 
32
 
28. 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883). 
  
Myrdal had been “made to feel from the start” of his research on the 
“American dilemma” of race that social equality had “concrete 
29. Id. (emphasis added). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY 586 (1944).  
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implications and a central importance for the Negro problem in 
America.”33  Yet he observed that its meaning was always “kept vague 
and elusive, and the theory loose and ambiguous.”34
One moment [the theory] will be stretched to cover and 
justify every form of social segregation and 
discrimination, and, in addition, all the inequalities in 
justice, politics and breadwinning.  The next moment it 
will be narrowed to express only the denial of close 
personal intimacies and intermarriage.  The very lack of 
precision allows the notion of “no social equality” to 
rationalize the rather illogical and wavering system of 
color caste in America.
  Myrdal wrote: 
35
That powerful “notion,” which Myrdal found so central to twentieth-
century segregation, had its foundation in the Civil War-era debate 
about racial equality.  From the beginning, opponents of expansive 
racial equality invoked “social equality” with the same opportunistic 
inconsistency as they would in the mid-twentieth century. 
 
When Abraham Lincoln said in 1858 that he believed that black and 
white people had equal natural rights but that he did not support 
political or social equality between the races, of course he could not 
have imagined the Civil War’s dramatic impact on the nation.  We 
cannot know how Lincoln ultimately would have defined political and 
social equality had he lived into the postwar period.  What is clear, 
however, is that the three categories of equality he invoked in the 1850s 
represented not only a paradigm for thinking about equality, but also a 
problematic.  Before the war, no one needed to press Lincoln on exactly 
what those categories would include or exclude, because the question of 
the status of African Americans after emancipation was purely 
hypothetical.  After the war, however, it was an urgent matter of policy.  
And after the war, the argument against “social equality” became a 
powerful tool for those who sought to limit the period’s most egalitarian 
aspirations. 
 
 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id.  
